This section is normative. It addresses the fundamental control and security objectives outlined in [HSPD-12], including the identity proofing requirements for federal employees and contractors.
Note that identity proofing, registration, issuance and maintenance processes outlined in this section, or portions thereof, may be outsourced by the issuer to third-party organizations or service providers. For further details on outsourcing issuer functions, refer to Section 2.2 of [SP 800-79].
[HSPD-12] establishes control objectives for secure and reliable identification of federal employees and contractors. These control objectives, provided in paragraph 3 of the directive, are quoted here:
(3) “Secure and reliable forms of identification” for purposes of this directive means identification that (a) is issued based on sound criteria for verifying an individual employee’s identity; (b) is strongly resistant to identity fraud, tampering, counterfeiting, and terrorist exploitation; (c) can be rapidly authenticated electronically; and (d) is issued only by providers whose reliability has been established by an official accreditation process.
Each agency’s PIV implementation SHALL meet the control objectives listed above including, but not limited to, processes that ensure that
Federal departments and agencies SHALL use the credentialing eligibility standards issued by the Director of the Office of Personnel Management (OPM)2 and OMB.3
Federal departments and agencies must follow investigative requirements established by the Suitability and Credentialing Executive Agent and the Security Executive Agent. Departments and agencies SHALL use position designation guidance issued by the Executive Agents. The designation of the position determines the prerequisite investigative requirement. Individuals being processed for a PIV Card SHALL receive the required investigation and are subject to any applicable reinvestigation or continuous vetting requirements to maintain their PIV eligibility.
The minimum requirement for PIV Credential eligibility determination is a completed and favorably adjudicated Tier 1 investigation, formerly called a National Agency Check with Written Inquiries (NACI).4
For individuals for whom no prior investigation exists, the appropriate required investigation SHALL be initiated with the authorized federal investigative service provider and the FBI NCHC portion of the background investigation SHALL be completed and favorably adjudicated prior to PIV Card issuance.
Once the investigation is completed, the authorized adjudicative entity SHALL adjudicate the investigation and report the final eligibility determination to the Central Verification System (or successor) and, if applicable, their enrollment in the Continuous Vetting Program as defined in [EO 13764]. This determination SHALL be recorded in or referenced by the PIV enrollment record to reflect PIV eligibility for the PIV cardholder.
For full guidance on PIV credentialing investigative and adjudicative requirements, to include continuous vetting, issuers must work closely with their personnel security/suitability offices to ensure adherence to the latest federal personnel vetting guidance as provided by the Executive Agents.
This section applies to applicants that do not have a completed and favorably adjudicated Tier 1 or higher federal background investigation on record that can be located and referenced.
A full set of fingerprints SHALL be collected from each PIV applicant who is lacking an on-record background investigation.
Biometric identification using fingerprints is the primary input to law enforcement checks. In cases where ten fingerprints are not available, then as many fingers as possible SHALL be imaged as per guidance in [SP 800-76]. In cases where no fingers are available to be imaged, agencies SHALL seek guidance from their respective investigative service provider for alternative means of performing law enforcement checks.
Fingerprint collection SHALL conform to the procedural and technical specifications of [SP 800-76].
The following biometric data SHALL be collected from each PIV applicant:
The following biometric data MAY be collected from a PIV applicant:
If the identity proofing and enrollment process is performed over multiple visits, an automated biometric verification attempt comparing the applicant’s newly captured biometric characteristics against biometric data collected during a previous visit SHALL be performed at each visit and return a positive verification decision.
If biometric data was collected as specified in Section 2.3 and if collection of biometric data as specified in this section and in Section 2.3 occur on separate occasions, a biometric comparison SHALL be performed to confirm that the two fingerprints collected for off-card one-to-one comparisons elicit a positive biometric verification decision when compared to the same two fingerprints from the original set of ten fingerprints.
Biometric data collection SHALL conform to the procedural and technical specifications of [SP 800-76]. The choice of fingers to use for mandatory fingerprint templates and optional fingerprint templates MAY vary between persons. The recommended selection and order is specified in [SP 800-76].
The full set of fingerprints SHALL be collected for biometric identification against databases of fingerprints maintained by the FBI.
The two mandatory fingerprints SHALL be used for the preparation of biometric templates to be stored on the PIV Card as described in Section 4.2.3.1. The fingerprints provide an interoperable authentication mechanism through an off-card comparison scheme (BIO or BIO-A) as described in Section 6.2.1. These fingerprints are also the primary means of authentication during PIV issuance and maintenance processes.
The optional fingerprints MAY be used for the preparation of biometric templates for OCC as described in Section 4.2.3.1. OCC MAY be used for PIV issuance and maintenance processes as applicable, card activation as described in Section 4.3.1, and cardholder authentication (OCC-AUTH) as described in Section 6.2.2.
Agencies MAY choose to collect electronic iris images as an additional biometric characteristic. If collected, the electronic iris images SHALL be stored on the PIV Card as described in Section 4.2.3.1. The images MAY be used for cardholder authentication (BIO or BIO-A) as described in Section 6.2.1. Electronic iris images are an additional means of authentication during PIV issuance and maintenance processes.
The electronic facial image SHALL be stored on the PIV Card as described in Section 4.2.3.1. It SHALL be printed on the PIV Card according to Section 4.1.4.1. The image MAY be used for cardholder authentication (BIO or BIO-A) as described in Section 6.2.1. It MAY be retrieved and displayed on guard workstations to augment other authentication processes from Section 6.2. The electronic facial image is an additional means of authentication during PIV issuance and maintenance processes when used with an automated facial comparison algorithm.
PIV background investigation, identity proofing, registration, and issuance processes MAY be performed across multiple sessions at different facilities. If multiple sessions are needed, the applicant SHALL be linked through a positive biometric verification decision obtained from an automated comparison of biometric characteristics captured at a previous session to biometric characteristics captured during the current session. Issuers SHALL follow applicable federal laws and regulations regarding the retention and destruction of biometric data.
For linking to background investigations, only fingerprints SHALL be used, since fingerprints are the only biometric characteristic used for background investigations. For all other purposes, verification attempts MAY be performed against any available biometric characteristic stored electronically on the PIV Card or in the enrollment record.
Note: This section was formerly entitled “Chain-of-Trust”.
The card issuer SHALL maintain the enrollment record for each issued PIV Card. These enrollment records are created and maintained through the methods of contemporaneous acquisition at each step of the PIV issuance process—typically including identity proofing, registration, and biometric enrollment.
PIV enrollment records SHALL maintain an auditable sequence of enrollment events to facilitate binding an applicant to multiple transactions that might take place at different times and locations.5 These records are generally stored as part of the cardholder’s PIV identity account, either as part of the issuer’s IDMS or through links to records in other related systems (e.g., card management systems).
PIV enrollment records SHOULD include the following data:
The biometric data records in the PIV enrollment records SHALL be valid for a maximum of 12 years. In order to mitigate aging effects and thereby maintain operational readiness of a cardholder’s PIV Card, agencies MAY require biometric enrollment more frequently than 12 years.
PIV enrollment records contain Personally Identifiable Information (PII). PII SHALL be protected in a manner that protects the individual’s privacy and maintains the integrity of the records both in transit and at rest.
PIV enrollment records can be applied in several situations, including the following:
To facilitate interagency transfer of enrollment data, systems may import and export enrollment records in the manner and representation described in [SP 800-156].
Identity proofing and registration requirements for the issuance of PIV Cards meet Identity Assurance Level (IAL) 3 since they follow a tailored process based on [SP 800-63A] IAL3 requirements. Departments and agencies SHALL follow an identity proofing and registration process that meets the requirements defined below when issuing PIV Cards.
The department or agency SHALL adopt and use an identity proofing and registration process that is approved in accordance with [SP 800-79].
The department or agency SHALL follow investigative requirements as outlined in Section 2.2.
Biometric data SHALL be captured as specified in Section 2.3 and Section 2.4.
The applicant SHALL appear in person at least once before the issuance of a PIV Card, either at the issuing facility or at a supervised remote identity proofing station (as described in Section 2.7.1).
During identity proofing, the applicant SHALL be required to provide two original forms of identity source documents.6 These documents SHALL be validated to ensure that they are genuine and authentic, not counterfeit, fake, or forgeries. Validation of physical security features SHALL be performed by trained staff. When they are available, cryptographic security features SHOULD be used to validate evidence.7 The identity source documents SHALL relate to the applicant. The identity source documents SHALL NOT be expired or cancelled. If the two identity source documents bear different names, evidence of a formal name change SHALL be provided. At least one identity source document SHALL meet the requirements of Strong evidence as specified in [SP 800-63A] and be one of the following forms of identification:
The second piece of evidence MAY be from the list above, but it SHALL NOT be of the same type as the primary identity source document.8 The second identity source document MAY also be one of the following:
Note: One piece of Strong evidence and one other piece of evidence meeting the requirements of Fair evidence in [SP 800-63A] are considered sufficient for issuance of a PIV Card because the requirement for a federal background investigation is considered a compensating control for identity proofing at IAL3. Similarly, the federal background investigation requirement is considered a compensating control for the SP 800-63A requirement to validate evidence by comparison of details with the issuing or authoritative sources.
Departments and agencies SHALL ensure that driver’s licenses and ID cards presented by applicants comply with [REAL-ID] when required pursuant to DHS regulations. State-issued driver’s licenses and ID cards that are not [REAL-ID] compliant MAY be used until the full enforcement date under [6 CFR § 37.5].
The PIV identity proofing, registration, issuance, and reissuance processes SHALL adhere to the principle of separation of duties to ensure that no single individual has the capability to issue a PIV Card without the cooperation of another authorized person.
The identity proofing and registration process used when verifying the identity of the applicant SHALL be accredited by the department or agency as satisfying the requirements above and approved in writing by the head or deputy (or equivalent) of the federal department or agency.
The requirements for identity proofing and registration also apply to citizens of foreign countries who are working for the U.S. Federal Government overseas. However, a process for identity proofing and registration SHALL be established using a method approved by the U.S. Department of State’s Bureau of Diplomatic Security, except for employees under the command of a U.S. area military commander. These procedures vary depending on the country.
Departments and agencies MAY use a supervised remote identity proofing process for the identity proofing of PIV Card applicants. This process involves the use of an issuer-controlled station at a remote location that is connected to a trained operator at a central location. The goal of this arrangement is to permit identity proofing and enrollment of individuals in remote locations where it is not practical for them to travel to the agency for in-person identity proofing.
Supervised remote identity proofing takes advantage of improvements in sensor technology (e.g., cameras and biometric capture devices) and communications bandwidth to closely duplicate the security of in-person identity proofing. This is done through the use of specialized equipment to support an enrollment station that is under the control of either the issuer or a third party that is trusted by the issuer.
The following forms of protection SHALL be provided by either inherent capabilities of the station or staff at the station location:
Supervised remote identity proofing SHALL meet the following requirements:
If biometric data cannot be collected per the criteria defined in [SP 800-76] or if validation of the identity evidence is inadequate, supervised remote identity proofing SHALL NOT be used and the identity proofing and enrollment will be performed in person at the issuer’s facility. The trained operator SHALL terminate a supervised remote identity proofing session and require in-person identity proofing at an issuing facility if there is reasonable basis to believe11 that the applicant is attempting to bypass protection capabilities of the station.
Departments and agencies SHALL meet the requirements defined below when issuing PIV Cards. The issuance process used when issuing PIV Cards SHALL be accredited by the department or agency as satisfying the requirements below and approved in writing by the head or deputy (or equivalent) of the federal department or agency.
PIV Cards that contain topographical defects (e.g., scratches, poor color, fading, etc.) or that are not properly printed SHALL be destroyed. The PIV Card issuer is responsible for the card stock, its management, and its integrity.
In limited circumstances, federal employees and contractors are permitted to use pseudonyms during the performance of their official duties with the approval of their employing agency. If an agency determines that the use of a pseudonym is necessary12 to protect an employee or contractor (e.g., from physical harm, severe distress, or harassment), the agency may formally authorize the issuance of a PIV Card to the employee or contractor using the agency-approved pseudonym. The issuance of a PIV Card using an authorized pseudonym SHALL follow the procedures in Section 2.8 except that the card issuer SHALL receive satisfactory evidence that the pseudonym is authorized by the agency.
In some instances, an individual’s status as a federal employee or contractor will lapse for a brief time period. For example, a federal employee may leave one federal agency for another federal agency and thus incur a short employment lapse period, or an individual who was under contract to a federal agency may receive a new contract from that agency shortly after the previous contract expired.13 In these instances, the card issuer MAY issue a new PIV Card without repeating the identity proofing and registration process if the issuer can obtain the applicant’s PIV enrollment record containing biometric data records from the issuer of the applicant’s previous PIV Card.
When issuing a PIV Card under the grace period, the card issuer SHALL verify that PIV Card issuance has been authorized by a proper authority and that the employee or contractor’s background investigation is valid. Re-investigations SHALL be performed, if required, in accordance with the federal investigative standards. At the time of issuance, the card issuer SHALL perform biometric verification of the applicant to the biometric data records in the applicant’s previous PIV enrollment record. On a positive biometric verification decision, the new PIV Card SHALL be released to the applicant. If the biometric verification decision is negative, or if no biometric data records are available, the cardholder SHALL provide two identity source documents (as specified in Section 2.7), and an attending operator SHALL inspect these and compare the cardholder with the electronic facial image retrieved from the enrollment data record and the photograph printed on the new PIV Card.
Departments and agencies MAY use a supervised remote identity proofing station as described in Section 2.7.1 for the processes involved in the issuance of PIV Cards. This involves the use of an issuer-controlled station at a remote location that is connected to a trained operator at a central location. The goal of this arrangement is to permit issuance to individuals in remote locations where it is not practical for them to travel to the agency for in-person issuance of their PIV credential.
Remote issuance SHALL satisfy all of the requirements of Section 2.8. The issuer SHALL have local trained staff to securely maintain custody of card stock received by the remote station when the station is used for PIV Card issuance.
If biometric data cannot be positively verified per the criteria defined in [SP 800-76], remote issuance SHALL NOT be used and issuance will be performed in person at the issuer’s facility. The trained operator SHALL terminate a remote issuance session and require in-person issuance at an issuing facility if there is reasonable basis to believe11 that the applicant is attempting to bypass protection capabilities of the station.
The PIV Card SHALL be maintained using processes that comply with this section.
The data and credentials held by the PIV Card may need to be updated or invalidated prior to the expiration date of the card. For example, a previously issued PIV Card needs to be invalidated when the cardholder changes their name or employment status. In this regard, procedures for PIV Card maintenance must be integrated into department and agency procedures to ensure effective card maintenance. In order to maintain operational readiness of a cardholder’s PIV Card, agencies may require PIV Card update, reissuance, or biometric enrollment more frequently than the maximum PIV Card and biometric characteristic lifetimes stated in this Standard. Shorter lifetimes MAY be specified by agency policy.
Reissuance is the process by which a new PIV Card is issued to a cardholder without the need to repeat the entire identity proofing and registration process. The reissuance process may be used to replace a PIV Card that is nearing expiration, in the event of an employee status or attribute change, or to replace a PIV Card that has been compromised, lost, stolen, or damaged. The cardholder may also apply for reissuance of a PIV Card if one or more logical credentials have been compromised. The identity proofing, registration, and issuance processes, as described in Section 2.7 and Section 2.8, SHALL be repeated if the issuer does not maintain a PIV enrollment record that includes biometric data records for the cardholder.
If the expiration date of the new PIV Card is later than the expiration date of the old card, or if any data about the cardholder is being changed, the card issuer SHALL ensure that an adjudicative entity has authorized the issuance of the new PIV Card. The issuer SHALL ensure that the adjudicative entity has verified that there is a PIV eligibility determination in an authoritative record, such as the agency’s IDMS or the Central Verification System (or successor).
The issuer SHALL perform a biometric verification of the applicant to the biometric data records of the PIV enrollment record or to the biometric data records of the PIV Card using the BIO-A or OCC-AUTH authentication mechanisms. Minimum accuracy requirements for the biometric verification are specified in [SP 800-76]. On a positive biometric verification decision, the new PIV Card SHALL be released to the applicant. If the biometric verification decision is negative, or if no biometric data records are available, the cardholder SHALL provide two identity source documents (as specified in Section 2.7), and an attending operator SHALL inspect these and compare the cardholder with the electronic facial image retrieved from the enrollment data record and the photograph printed on the new PIV Card.
The old PIV Card SHALL be revoked when the new PIV Card is issued. The revocation process SHALL include the following:
In the case of a lost, stolen, or compromised card, normal revocation procedures SHALL be completed within 18 hours of notification. In certain cases, 18 hours is an unacceptable delay, and in those cases emergency procedures SHOULD be executed to disseminate the information as rapidly as possible.
If there is any data change about the cardholder, the issuer SHALL record this data change in the PIV enrollment record, if applicable. If the changed data is the cardholder’s name, then the issuer SHALL meet the requirements in Section 2.9.1.1.
Previously collected biometric data MAY be reused with the new PIV Card if the expiration date of the new PIV Card is no later than 12 years after the date that the biometric data was obtained. As biometric system error rates generally increase with the time elapsed since initial collection (reference aging, [ISO 2382-37]), issuers MAY refresh biometric data in the PIV enrollment record during the re-issuance process. Even if the same biometric data is reused with the new PIV Card, the digital signature must be recomputed with the new FASC-N and card UUID.
A new PIV authentication certificate and a new card authentication certificate SHALL be generated. The corresponding certificates SHALL be populated with the new FASC-N and card UUID. For cardholders with government-issued email accounts, the digital signature and key management keys and associated certificates SHALL be populated. A new digital signature key and associated certificate SHALL be generated on the new PIV Card, while key management keys and associated certificates MAY be imported to the new PIV Card.
Name changes frequently occur as a result of marriage, divorce, or as a matter of personal preference. In the event that a cardholder notifies the card issuer that their name has changed and presents the card issuer with evidence of a formal name change—such as a marriage certificate, a divorce decree, judicial recognition of a name change, or other mechanism permitted by state law or regulation—the card issuer SHALL issue the cardholder a new card following the procedures set out in Section 2.9.1 and notify the respective adjudicative entity of the name change to ensure that appropriate records are updated. If the expiration date of the new card is no later than the expiration date of the old PIV Card and no data about the cardholder other than the cardholder’s name is being changed, then the new PIV Card MAY be issued without obtaining the approval of the adjudicative entity and without performing a re-investigation.
A PIV Card post-issuance update MAY be performed without replacing the PIV Card in cases where none of the printed information on the surface of the card is changed. The post-issuance update applies to cases where one or more certificates, keys, biometric data records, or signed data objects are updated. A post-issuance update SHALL NOT modify the PIV Card expiration date, FASC-N, card UUID, or cardholder UUID.
A PIV Card post-issuance update MAY be done locally (i.e., performed with the issuer in physical custody of the PIV Card) or remotely (i.e., performed with the PIV Card at a remote location). Post-issuance updates SHALL be performed with issuer security controls equivalent to those applied during PIV Card reissuance. For remote post-issuance updates, the following SHALL apply:
Post-issuance updates to biometric data records, other than to the digital signature blocks within the biometric data records, SHALL satisfy the requirements for PIV Card activation reset specified in Section 2.9.3.
If the PIV authentication key (Section 4.2.2.1), asymmetric card authentication key (Section 4.2.2.2), digital signature key (Section 4.2.2.1), or key management key (Section 4.2.2.5) was compromised, the corresponding certificate SHALL be revoked.
Both the Personal Identification Number (PIN) and OCC activation methods for a PIV Card can be reset in certain circumstances.
The PIN on a PIV Card may need to be reset if the cardholder has forgotten the PIN or if PIN-based cardholder authentication has been disabled by the usage of an invalid PIN more than the allowed number of retries. Fingers might need to be re-enrolled for OCC if the cardholder has experienced epidermal scarring or similar physical changes, resulting in false negative biometric verification decisions, or if OCC has been disabled by exceeding the allowed number of negative biometric verification decisions. No more than 10 consecutive activation retries for each of the activation methods (i.e., PIN and OCC attempts) SHALL be permitted. Card issuers MAY further restrict the maximum retry limit to a lower value.
Cardholders MAY change their PINs at any time by providing the current PIN and the new PIN values, as specified in [SP 800-73].
Departments and agencies MAY adopt more stringent procedures for PIN or OCC reset (including disallowing resets); such procedures SHALL be formally documented by each department and agency.
PIN reset MAY be performed in person at an issuing facility, at a kiosk operated by the issuer, remotely via a general computing platform, or at a supervised remote identity proofing station:
The remote PIN reset operation SHALL satisfy the requirements for remote, post-issuance updates specified in Section 2.9.2.
Regardless of the PIN reset procedure used, the chosen PIN SHALL meet the activation requirements specified in Section 4.3.1.
Both fingerprints used for OCC SHALL be replaced during an OCC reset.
OCC reset MAY be performed in person at an issuing facility or a supervised remote identity proofing station:
A PIV Card is terminated when the department or agency that issued the card determines that the cardholder is no longer eligible to have a PIV Card. The PIV Card SHALL be terminated under any of the following circumstances:
Similar to the situation in which the PIV Card is compromised, normal termination procedures must be in place. The PIV Card SHALL be revoked through the following procedure:
In addition, the PIV Card termination procedures SHALL ensure that all derived PIV credentials bound to the PIV identity account are invalidated as specified in Section 2.10.2.
If the card cannot be collected, normal termination procedures SHALL be completed within 18 hours of notification. In certain cases, 18 hours is an unacceptable delay and in those cases emergency procedures SHOULD be executed to disseminate the information as rapidly as possible.
The PII collected from the cardholder SHALL be disposed of in accordance with the stated privacy and data retention policies of the department or agency.
Derived PIV credentials are additional PIV credentials that are issued based on proof of possession and control of a PIV Card. These credentials are not embedded in the PIV Card but instead are stand-alone or integrated in a variety of devices and platforms. Derived PIV credentials play an important role for environments where use of the PIV Card is not easily supported.
Issuance of a derived PIV credential is an instance of the post-enrollment binding of an authenticator described in [SP 800-63B] and SHALL be performed in accordance with the requirements that apply to physical authenticators as well as the requirements in this section.
The binding and issuance of derived PIV credentials SHALL use valid PIV Cards to establish cardholder identity in accordance with [SP 800-157]. Derived PIV credentials SHALL meet the requirements for Authenticator Assurance Level (AAL) 2 or 3 specified in [SP 800-63B]. All derived PIV credentials meeting AAL2 but not AAL3 requirements SHALL allow authentication at AAL2 only. Derived PIV credentials meeting AAL3 requirements also fulfill the requirements of AAL2 and can be used in circumstances requiring AAL2. The issuer SHALL attempt to promptly notify the cardholder of the binding of a derived PIV credential through an independent means that would not afford an attacker an opportunity to erase the notification. More than one independent notification method MAY be used to ensure prompt receipt by the cardholder.
Derived PIV credentials SHALL be bound to the cardholder’s PIV identity account only by the issuing department or agency responsible for managing that PIV identity account. If the issuing department or agency relies on shared services for portions of the PIV Card or Derived PIV credential issuance process, it is the responsibility of the issuing department or agency to ensure that all credentials and IDMS records are properly maintained throughout the PIV lifecycle.
Derived PIV credentials SHALL be invalidated in any of the following circumstances:
If the derived PIV credential to be invalidated contains a derived PIV authentication certificate and the corresponding private key cannot be securely zeroized or destroyed, the CA SHALL be informed and the certificate corresponding to the derived PIV authentication key SHALL be revoked.
A derived PIV credential SHALL NOT be accepted for authentication once the credential has been invalidated. When invalidation occurs, the issuer SHALL notify the cardholder of the change.
PKI-based derived PIV Credentials (i.e., those containing attribute information describing the PIV cardholder) SHALL be updated or reissued as described in [SP 800-157] Section 2.3 when the corresponding PIV Card is updated or reissued. Non-PKI derived PIV credentials are not required to be updated or reissued in these situations.
[HSPD-12] explicitly states that “protect[ing] personal privacy” is a requirement of the PIV system. As such, all departments and agencies SHALL implement the PIV system in accordance with the spirit and letter of all privacy controls specified in this Standard, as well as those specified in federal privacy laws and policies including but not limited to the E-Government Act of 2002 [E-Gov], the Privacy Act of 1974 [PRIVACY], and OMB [M-03-22], as applicable.
Departments and agencies may have a wide variety of uses for the PIV system and its components that were not intended or anticipated by the President in issuing [HSPD-12]. In considering whether a proposed use of the PIV system is appropriate, departments and agencies SHALL consider the aforementioned control objectives and the purpose of this Standard, namely “to enhance security, increase Government efficiency, reduce identity fraud, and protect personal privacy” as per [HSPD-12]. No department or agency SHALL implement a use of the identity credential inconsistent with these control objectives.
To ensure privacy throughout the PIV lifecycle, departments and agencies SHALL do the following:
See [CSP] for details about the investigation initiation process. ↩
NACI investigations were replaced with Tier 1 investigations upon implementation of the 2012 Federal Investigative Standards. ↩
For example, ten fingerprints for law enforcement checks may be collected at one time and place, and two fingerprints for PIV Card templates may be collected at a later time and different place, provided that a biometric comparison confirms that the two fingerprints belong to the original set of ten fingerprints. ↩
Departments and agencies may choose to accept only a subset of the identity source documents listed in this section. For example, in cases where identity proofing for PIV Card issuance is performed prior to verification of employment authorization, departments and agencies may choose to require the applicant to provide identity source documents that satisfy the requirements of Form I-9, Employment Eligibility Verification, in addition to the requirements specified in this section. ↩
For example, digital identity evidence signed by the issuing authority can be cryptographically verified (e.g., MRZ signature validation of passports). ↩
For example, if the first source document is a foreign passport (e.g., Italy), the second source document cannot be another foreign passport (e.g., France). ↩
Security practices to mitigate malicious code threats are outside the scope of this document (see [SP 800-53] for a catalog of security and privacy controls for federal information systems). ↩
A controlled-access environment is a location with limited egress points where staff can see the station while performing other duties. ↩
A reasonable basis to believe occurs when a disinterested observer with knowledge of the same facts and circumstances would reasonably reach the same conclusion. ↩ ↩2
An example can be seen in Section 10.5.7 of the Internal Revenue Service Manual (https://www.irs.gov/irm/part10/irm_10-005-007), which authorizes approval by an employee’s supervisor of the use of a pseudonym to protect the employee’s personal safety. ↩
For the purposes of this section, a lapse is considered to be brief if it is not long enough to require that a new or updated background investigation be performed consistent with Executive Agents’ guidance. ↩
If OCC is being reset due to epidermal damage on a specific finger, it may be prudent to perform the biometric comparison with a different finger or different biometric characteristic. However, it is possible that the comparison algorithm available to the issuer could obtain a positive biometric verification decision with damaged epidermis while the OCC algorithm could not. ↩ ↩2
Privacy official refers to the Senior Agency Official for Privacy (SAOP) or Chief Privacy Officer (CPO). ↩
Agencies may refer to [SP 800-122] for best practice guidelines on protection of PII. ↩