This section is normative. It provides the requirements for the PIV front-end subsystem components.
References to the PIV Card in this section pertain to its physical characteristics only. References to the front of the card apply to the side of the card that contains electronic contacts. References to the back of the card apply to the side opposite the front.
The PIV Card’s physical appearance and other characteristics should balance the need to have the PIV Card commonly recognized as a federal identification card while providing the flexibility to support individual department and agency requirements. Having a common look for PIV Cards is important in meeting the objectives of improved security and interoperability. In support of these objectives, consistent placement of printed components and technology is necessary.
The PIV Card SHALL comply with the physical characteristics described in [ISO 7810], [ISO 10373], and [ISO 7816] for contact cards in addition to [ISO 14443] for contactless cards.
The printed material SHALL NOT rub off during the life of the PIV Card. The printing process SHALL NOT deposit debris on the printer rollers during printing and laminating. Printed material SHALL NOT interfere with the ICCs or related components, nor SHALL it obstruct access to machine-readable information.
To combat counterfeiting and alterations, the PIV Card SHALL contain security features outlined in the American Association of Motor Vehicle Administrators (AAMVA) Drivers License/Identification Card (DL/ID) Card Design Standard [CDS]. The Card Design Standard classifies security features into three categories, depending on the inspection level required for verification:
A PIV Card SHALL incorporate at least one security feature at inspection level 1 or inspection level 2. Federal departments and agencies SHOULD incorporate additional security features and include all three inspection levels.
Incorporation of security features SHALL
All security features SHOULD maintain their function for the life of the card. As a generally accepted security procedure, federal departments and agencies SHOULD periodically review the viability, effectiveness, and currency of employed tamper resistance and anti-counterfeiting methods.
This section describes the physical requirements for the PIV Card.
The PIV Card SHALL contain a contact and a contactless ICC interface.
The card body SHALL be white in accordance with color representation in Section 4.1.5. Only security features, as described in Section 4.1.2, may modify the perceived color slightly. The presence of security features SHALL NOT prevent the recognition of white as the principal card body color by a person with normal vision (corrected or uncorrected) at a working distance of 50 cm to 200 cm.
The card body structure SHALL consist of card materials that satisfy the card characteristics in [ISO 7810] and test methods in [ANSI 322]. Although the [ANSI 322] test methods do not currently specify compliance requirements, the tests SHALL be used to evaluate card material durability and performance. These tests SHALL include card flexure, static stress, plasticizer exposure, impact resistance, card structural integrity, surface abrasion, temperature and humidity-induced dye migration, ultraviolet light exposure, and laundry test. Cards SHALL NOT malfunction or delaminate after hand cleaning with a mild soap and water mixture.
Sample cards SHALL be subjected to sunlight exposure in accordance with Section 5.12 of [ISO 10373] or to ultraviolet and daylight fading exposure in accordance with [ANSI 322]. Sunlight exposure in accordance with [ISO 10373] SHALL be in the form of actual, concentrated, or artificial sunlight that appropriately reflect 2 000 hours of southwestern United States’ sunlight. Concentrated sunlight exposure SHALL be performed in accordance with [G90-17] and accelerated exposure in accordance with [G155-2013]. Sample cards SHALL be subjected to the [ISO 10373] dynamic bending test and SHALL have no visible cracks or failures after the [ISO 10373] or [ANSI 322] exposure.
There are methods by which proper card orientation can be indicated. Section 4.1.4.3, for example, defines Zones 21F and 22F, where card orientation features MAY be applied.1 Note: If an agency determines that tactilely discernible markers for PIV Cards impose an undue burden, the agency SHALL implement policies and procedures to accommodate employees and contractors with disabilities in accordance with Sections 501 and 504 of the Rehabilitation Act.
The card SHALL be 27 mil to 33 mil (0.68 mm to 0.84 mm) thick before lamination, in accordance with [ISO 7810].
The PIV Card SHALL NOT be embossed other than for security and accessibility features.
Decals SHALL NOT be adhered to the card.
Departments and agencies MAY choose to punch an opening in the card body to enable the card to be oriented by touch or to be worn on a lanyard. Departments and agencies should ensure such alterations are closely coordinated with the card vendor and manufacturer to ensure the card material integrity and printing process are not adversely impacted. Departments and agencies SHOULD ensure such alterations do not
The card material SHALL withstand the effects of temperatures required by the application of a polyester laminate on one or both sides of the card by commercial off-the-shelf (COTS) equipment. The thickness added due to a laminate layer SHALL NOT interfere with the smart card reader operation. The card material SHALL allow production of a flat card in accordance with [ISO 7810] after lamination of one or both sides of the card.
The information on a PIV Card SHALL be in visual printed and electronic form. This section covers the placement of visual and printed information. It does not cover information stored in electronic form, such as stored data elements or other possible machine-readable technologies. Logically stored data elements are discussed in Section 4.2.
As noted in Section 4.1.3, the PIV Card SHALL contain a contact and a contactless ICC interface. This Standard does not specify the number of chips used to support the mandated contact and contactless interfaces.
To achieve a common PIV Card appearance and provide departments and agencies with the flexibility to augment the card with department- or agency-specific requirements, the card SHALL contain printed information and machine-readable technologies. Mandated and optional items SHALL be placed as described and depicted. Printed data SHALL NOT interfere with machine-readable technology.
Areas that are marked as reserved SHOULD NOT be used for printing. The reason for the recommended reserved areas is that placement of the embedded contactless ICC module may vary between manufacturers, and there are constraints that prohibit printing over the embedded contactless module. The PIV Card topography provides flexibility for placement of the embedded module, either in the upper right corner or in the lower portion. Printing restrictions apply only to the area where the embedded module is located.
Unless otherwise specified, all data labels SHALL be printed in 5 pt Arial with the corresponding data in 6 pt Arial Bold. If the Arial font is not available, a visually similar font, such as Public Sans [PublicSans], MAY be substituted for all references to Arial within this Standard. If such a substitution is made, the substitution SHALL be consistently applied to all uses of the Arial font on the PIV Card. Unless otherwise specified, all text SHALL be printed in black.
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Names in the primary identifier and the first name in the secondary identifier SHALL NOT be abbreviated. If other names and conventional prefixes and suffixes are included, they SHALL be included in the secondary identifier and MAY be abbreviated. The special character “.” (period) SHALL indicate such abbreviations, as shown in Figure 4-2. Other uses of special symbols (e.g., the apostrophe in “O’BRIEN”) are at the discretion of the issuer.
Name | Characteristics | Example |
---|---|---|
John Doe | Simple full name of individual who does not have a middle name, two lines sufficient at 10 pt. | |
Anna Maria Eriksson | Simple full name, two lines sufficient at 10 pt. | |
Anna Maria Eriksson | Simple full name with abbreviated middle name, two lines sufficient at 10 pt. | |
Anna Maria Eriksson | Simple full name, one line sufficient for full name at 10 pt. | |
Susie Margaret Smith-Jones | Longer full name in two lines, sufficient space at 10 pt. | |
Susie Margaret Smith-Jones | Longer full name wrapped, two lines sufficient at 10 pt. | |
Chayapa Dejthamrong Krusuang Nilavadhanananda | Longer full name wrapped, two lines not sufficient at 10 pt. Reduce to 8 pt. | |
Vaasa Silvaan Beenelong Wooloomooloo Warrandyte Warwarnambool | Longer full name, two lines not sufficient at 8 pt, 7 pt allows sufficient space for three lines in Zone 2F. | |
Vaasa Silvaan Beenelong Wooloomooloo Warrandyte Warwarnambool | Same as previous but full name is wrapped. | |
Dingo Pontooroomooloo Vaasa Silvaan Beenelong Wooloomooloo Warrandyte Warwarnambool | Truncated full name, three lines at 7 pt not sufficient. |
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Foreign national color-coding has precedence over government employee and contractor color-coding. These colors SHALL be reserved and SHALL NOT be employed for other purposes. These colors SHALL be printed in accordance with the color specifications provided in Section 4.1.5. Zone 15F MAY be a solid or patterned line at the department or agency’s discretion.
This section contains a description of the optional information and machine-readable technologies that may be used as well as their respective placement. The storage capacity of all optional technologies is as prescribed by individual departments and agencies and is not addressed in this Standard. Although the items discussed in this section are optional, if used, they SHALL be placed on the card as designated in the examples provided and as noted.
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When Zone 15F indicates foreign national affiliation and the department or agency does not need to highlight emergency response official status, Zone 12F MAY be used to denote the country or countries of citizenship. If so used, the department or agency SHALL print the country name or the three-letter country abbreviation (alpha-3 format) in accordance with [ISO 3166]. Figure 4-4 illustrates an example of using country abbreviations for a card issued to a foreign national.
Note that this zone overlaps with an area that some card manufacturers might not allow to be used for printing.
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In the case of the Department of Defense, the back of the card will have a distinct appearance as depicted in Figure 4-8. This is necessary to display information required by the Geneva Accord and to facilitate legislatively mandated medical entitlements.
Figure 4-1. Card Front: Printable Areas and Required Data
Figure 4-2. Card Front: Optional Data Placement (Example 1)
Figure 4-3. Card Front: Optional Data Placement (Example 2)
Figure 4-4. Card Front: Optional Data Placement (Example 3)
Figure 4-5. Card Front: Optional Data Placement (Example 4)
Figure 4-6. Card Back: Printable Areas and Required Data
Figure 4-7. Card Back: Optional Data Placement (Example 1)
Figure 4-8. Card Back: Optional Data Placement (Example 2)
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Table 4-2 provides quantitative specifications for colors in four different color systems: sRGB Tristimulus [IEC 61966], sRGB [IEC 61966], CMYK (Cyan, Magenta, Yellow, and Key or ‘blacK’), and PANTONE®. Note the PANTONE® color cue mapping is approximate and will not produce an exact match. An agency or department MAY use the PANTONE® mappings in cases where the exact color scales are not available. Since the card body is white, the white color-coding is achieved by the absence of printing. Note that presence of security features, which MAY overlap colored or printed regions, may modify the perceived color. In the case of colored regions, the effect of overlap SHALL NOT prevent the recognition of the principal color by a person with normal vision (corrected or uncorrected) at a working distance of 50 cm to 200 cm.
Table 4-2. Color Representation
Color | Zone | sRGB Tristimulus | sRGB | CMYK | PANTONE® |
---|---|---|---|---|---|
White | 15F | 255, 255, 255 | 255, 255, 255 | 0, 0, 0, 0 | |
Green | 15F | 153, 255, 153 | 203, 255, 203 | 40, 0, 40, 0 | 359 C |
Blue | 15F | 0, 255, 255 | 0, 255, 255 | 100, 0, 0, 0 | 630 C |
Red | 12F | 253, 27, 20 | 254, 92, 79 | 0, 90, 86, 0 | 032 C |
This section defines the PIV Card’s logical identity credentials and the requirements for use of these credentials.
To support a variety of authentication mechanisms, the PIV Card SHALL contain multiple data elements for the purpose of verifying the cardholder’s identity at graduated assurance levels. The following mandatory data elements are part of the data model for PIV Card logical credentials that support authentication mechanisms that are interoperable across agencies:
This Standard also defines two data elements for the PIV Card data model that are mandatory if the cardholder has a government-issued email account at the time of PIV Card issuance. These data elements are
This Standard also defines optional data elements for the PIV Card data model. These optional data elements include
Additional data elements are specified in [SP 800-73].
PIV Card logical credentials fall into the following three categories:
Note: The CHUID authentication mechanism (Section 6.2.5) has been removed from this version of the Standard. The CHUID data element itself, however, has not been removed and continues to be mandatory as it supports other PIV authentication mechanisms. For example, the BIO, BIO-A, and SYM-CAK authentication mechanisms use the CHUID data element as a source for the card’s expiration date. The CHUID data element also provides the content signing certificate for some authentication mechanisms and unique identifiers for PACS ACLs.
The PIV Card SHALL include the CHUID, as defined in [SP 800-73]. The CHUID SHALL include two card identifiers: the Federal Agency Smart Credential Number (FASC-N) and the card UUID in the Global Unique Identification Number (GUID) data element of the CHUID. Each identifier uniquely identifies each card as specified in [SP 800-73]. The value of the card UUID SHALL be the 16 byte binary representation of a valid UUID as specified in [RFC 4122]. The CHUID SHALL also include an expiration date data element in machine-readable format that specifies when the card expires. The expiration date format and encoding rules are as specified in [SP 800-73].
A CHUID MAY also include a Cardholder UUID that represents a persistent identifier of the cardholder, as specified in [SP 800-73]. The value of the cardholder UUID SHALL be the 16 byte binary representation of a valid UUID, as specified in [RFC 4122].
The CHUID SHALL be accessible from both the contact and contactless interfaces of the PIV Card without card activation.
The FASC-N, card UUID, expiration date, and, if present, cardholder UUID SHALL NOT be modified post-issuance.
This Standard requires inclusion of the asymmetric signature field in the CHUID container. The asymmetric signature data element of the CHUID SHALL be encoded as a Cryptographic Message Syntax (CMS) external digital signature, as specified in [SP 800-73]. Algorithm and key size requirements for the asymmetric signature and digest algorithm are detailed in [SP 800-78].
The public key required to verify the digital signature SHALL be contained in
a content signing certificate, which SHALL be
issued under the id-fpki-common-piv-contentSigning
policy of [COMMON]. The content
signing certificate SHALL also include an extended key usage (extKeyUsage
) extension asserting id-PIV-content-signing
.
The public key SHALL be included in the certificates
field of the CMS external digital signature in a content signing certificate.
Additional descriptions for the PIV object identifiers are provided in Appendix B. The
content signing certificate SHALL NOT expire before the expiration of the card authentication certificate.
The PIV Card SHALL implement the cryptographic operations and support functions defined in [SP 800-78] and [SP 800-73].
The PIV Card has both mandatory and optional keys:
The PIV Card SHALL store private keys and corresponding public key certificates and SHALL perform cryptographic operations using the asymmetric private keys. At a minimum, the PIV Card SHALL store the PIV authentication key, the asymmetric card authentication key, and the corresponding public key certificates. The PIV Card SHALL also store a digital signature key, a key management key, and the corresponding public key certificates unless the cardholder does not have a government-issued email account at the time of PIV Card issuance.
With the exception of the card authentication key and keys used to establish secure messaging, cryptographic private key operations SHALL be performed only through the contact interface or the virtual contact interface. Any operation that MAY be performed over the contact interface of the PIV Card MAY also be performed over the virtual contact interface. Requirements for the virtual contact interface are specified in [SP 800-73].
All PIV cryptographic keys SHALL be generated within a cryptographic module with overall validation at [FIPS 140] Level 2 or above. In addition to an overall validation of Level 2, the PIV Card SHALL provide Level 3 physical security to protect the PIV private keys in storage. The scope of the validation for the PIV Card SHALL include all cryptographic operations performed over both the contact and contactless interfaces
Specific algorithm testing requirements for the cryptographic operations performed by the PIV Card application are specified in [SP 800-78].
Requirements specific to storage and access for each key are detailed in the following sections. Where applicable, key management requirements are also specified.
This key SHALL be generated on the PIV Card. The PIV Card SHALL NOT permit exportation of the PIV authentication key. The cryptographic operations that use the PIV authentication key SHALL be available through the contact interface and MAY additionally be available over the virtual contact interface of the PIV Card. Operations that use the PIV authentication key SHALL NOT be available through the contactless interface of the PIV Card. Private key operations MAY be performed using an activated PIV Card without explicit user action (e.g., the PIN need not be supplied for each operation).
The PIV Card SHALL store a corresponding X.509 certificate to support validation of the public key.
The X.509 certificate SHALL include the FASC-N in the Subject Alternative Name (SAN) extension using the
pivFASC-N
attribute to support physical access procedures. The X.509 certificate SHALL also include
the card UUID value from the GUID data element of the CHUID in the SAN extension.
The card UUID SHALL be encoded as a Uniform Resource Name (URN), as specified in Section 3 of
[RFC 4122]. The expiration date of the certificate SHALL be no later than the expiration date of the PIV
Card. The PIV authentication certificate MAY include a PIV background investigation indicator (previously known as the NACI indicator) extension (see Appendix B.2).
This non-critical extension indicates the status
of the cardholder’s background investigation at the time of card issuance. Section 5 of this document
specifies the certificate format and the key management infrastructure for the PIV authentication key.
The asymmetric card authentication key MAY be generated on the PIV Card or imported to the card. The PIV Card SHALL NOT permit exportation of the card authentication key. Cryptographic operations that use the card authentication key SHALL be available through the contact and contactless interfaces of the PIV Card and SHALL NOT be available through the virtual contact interface of the PIV Card. Private key operations MAY be performed using this key without card activation (e.g., the PIN need not be supplied for operations with this key).
The PIV Card SHALL store a corresponding X.509 certificate to support validation of the public key.
The X.509 certificate SHALL include the FASC-N in the SAN extension using the
pivFASC-N
attribute to support physical access procedures. The X.509 certificate SHALL also include
the card UUID value from the GUID data element of the CHUID in the SAN extension.
The card UUID SHALL be encoded as a URN, as specified in Section 3 of [RFC 4122]. The expiration date of
the certificate SHALL be no later than the expiration date of the PIV Card. Section 5 of this document
specifies the certificate format and the key management infrastructure for asymmetric card
authentication keys.
The symmetric card authentication key is deprecated in this version of the Standard. Both the symmetric card authentication key and the associated SYM-CAK authentication mechanism may be removed in a future revision of the Standard.
If used, the symmetric card authentication key MAY be imported onto the card by the issuer or be generated on the card. If present, the symmetric card authentication key SHALL be unique for each PIV Card and SHALL meet the algorithm and key size requirements stated in [SP 800-78]. If present, cryptographic operations using this key MAY be performed without card activation (e.g., the PIN need not be supplied for operations with this key). The cryptographic operations that use the symmetric card authentication key SHALL be available through the contact and contactless interfaces of the PIV Card and SHALL NOT be available through the virtual contact interface of the PIV Card. This Standard does not specify key management protocols or infrastructure requirements.
The PIV digital signature key SHALL be generated on the PIV Card. The PIV Card SHALL NOT permit exportation of the digital signature key. If this key is present, cryptographic operations that use the digital signature key SHALL be available through the contact interface and MAY additionally be available over the virtual contact interface of the PIV Card. Operations that use the digital signature key SHALL NOT be available through the contactless interface of the PIV Card. Private key operations SHALL NOT be performed without explicit user action, as this Standard requires the cardholder to authenticate to the PIV Card each time it performs a private key computation with the digital signature key.6
The PIV Card SHALL store a corresponding X.509 certificate to support validation of the public key. The expiration date of the certificate SHALL be no later than the expiration date of the PIV Card. Section 5 of this document specifies the certificate format and the key management infrastructure for PIV digital signature keys.
This key MAY be generated on the PIV Card or imported to the card. If present, the cryptographic operations that use the key management key SHALL be available through the contact interface and MAY additionally be available over the virtual contact interface of the PIV Card. Operations that use the key management key SHALL NOT be available through the contactless interface of the PIV Card. Private key operations MAY be performed using an activated PIV Card without explicit user action (e.g., the PIN need not be supplied for each operation).
The PIV Card SHALL store a corresponding X.509 certificate to support validation of the public key. Section 5 of this document specifies the certificate format and the key management infrastructure for key management keys.
If present, the PIV Card application administration key SHALL be imported onto the card by the issuer. If present, the cryptographic operations that use the PIV Card application administration key SHALL only be available through the contact interface unless otherwise specified by [SP 800-73].
The PIV secure messaging key supports the establishment of secure messaging and authentication using the SM-AUTH authentication mechanism. If present, the key SHALL be generated on the PIV Card and SHALL NOT be exported. The cryptographic operations that use the PIV secure messaging key SHALL be available through the contact and contactless interfaces of the PIV Card. Private key operations7 can be performed without access control restrictions. The PIV Card SHALL store a corresponding secure messaging card verifiable certificate (CVC) to support validation of the public key by the relying system. The use of the PIV secure messaging key and the CVC is further specified in [SP 800-73] and [SP 800-78].
When the key is used to establish secure messaging, it enables data and commands transmitted between the card and an external entity to be both integrity-protected and encrypted. Secure messaging MAY be used, for example, to enable the use of on-card biometric comparison. Once secure messaging has been established, a virtual contact interface MAY be established.
The PIV front-end subsystem employs biometric verification to automate the recognition of cardholders based on their biological characteristics. The PIV Card can digitally store fingerprint, face, and iris biometric characteristics. Techniques for storage, protection, and access of these biometric data records are outlined in the following sections and explained in depth in [SP 800-76] and [SP 800-73].
The following biometric data SHALL be stored on the PIV Card:
The following biometric data MAY also be stored on the PIV Card:
All biometric data SHALL be stored in the data elements referenced by [SP 800-73] and in conformance with the preparation and formatting specifications of [SP 800-76].
The integrity of all biometric data records, except for fingerprint biometric templates for OCC, SHALL be protected using digital signatures. The records SHALL be prepended with a Common Biometric Exchange Formats Framework (CBEFF) header and appended with the CBEFF signature block [NISTIR 6529-A].
The format for a CBEFF header is specified in [SP 800-76].
The CBEFF signature block contains the digital signature of the biometric data record and facilitates the verification of the integrity of the biometric data record. The CBEFF signature block SHALL be encoded as a CMS external digital signature as specified in [SP 800-76]. The algorithm and key size requirements for the digital signature and digest algorithm are detailed in [SP 800-78].
The public key required to verify the digital signature SHALL be in a content signing certificate,
which SHALL be issued under the id-fpki-common-piv-contentSigning
policy of [COMMON] and SHALL include an extended key usage (extKeyUsage
) extension asserting id-PIV-content-signing
. The signature on the biometric data record SHOULD be generated with the same signing key as the signature on the CHUID data object. The public key required to verify the digital signature is contained in the CHUID data object’s content signing certificate9 as detailed in Section 4.2.1.
The use of an different content signing key from that which signs the CHUID is deprecated in this revision of the Standard. If the signature on the biometric data record was generated with a different key than the signature on
the CHUID, the certificates
field of the CMS external digital signature SHALL include the content signing certificate required to verify the signature on the biometric data record. Otherwise, the certificates
field SHALL be omitted.
Additional descriptions for the PIV object identifiers are provided in Appendix B. The content signing certificate SHALL NOT expire before the expiration of the card authentication certificate.
The biometric data records, except for fingerprint biometric templates for OCC, that are stored on the card
OCC MAY be performed over the contact and contactless interfaces of the PIV Card to support card activation (Section 4.3.1) and cardholder authentication (Section 6.2.2). The fingerprint biometric templates for OCC SHALL NOT be exportable. If implemented, OCC SHALL be implemented and used in accordance with [SP 800-73] and [SP 800-76].
A cardholder is authenticated using the mechanisms described in Section 6. The authenticated identity MAY then be used as the basis for making authorization decisions. Unique identifiers for both authentication and authorization are provided in this Standard in order to uniquely identify the cardholder. The two types of identifiers that serve as identification (of the cardholder) for authentication and authorization purposes are as follows:
entryUUID
attribute of CMS-signed biometric data records and in the subjectAltName
extension of PIV authentication certificates. Similarly, the FASC-N is represented in the CHUID, in the pivFASC-N
attribute of CMS-signed biometric data records, and in the subjectAltName
extension of PIV authentication certificates.subjectAltName
extension in the PIV authentication certificate.The PIV Card SHALL be activated10 to perform privileged11 operations such as using the PIV authentication key, digital signature key, and key management key. The PIV Card SHALL be activated for privileged operations only after authenticating the cardholder or the appropriate card management system. Cardholder activation is described in Section 4.3.1 and card management system activation is described in Section 4.3.2.
PIV Cards SHALL implement user-based cardholder activation to allow privileged operations using PIV credentials held by the card. At a minimum, the PIV Card SHALL implement PIN-based cardholder activation in support of interoperability across departments and agencies. Other card activation mechanisms as specified in [SP 800-73] (e.g., OCC card activation) MAY be implemented and SHALL be discoverable. For PIN-based cardholder activation, the cardholder SHALL supply a numeric PIN. The PIN SHALL be transmitted to the PIV Card and checked by the card. If the PIN check is successful, the PIV Card is activated. The PIV Card SHALL include mechanisms to block activation of the card after a number of consecutive failed activation attempts. A maximum of 10 consecutive PIN retries SHALL be permitted unless a lower limit is imposed by the department or agency.
The cardholder SHALL be guided in selecting a strong PIN value. The PIN SHALL be a minimum of six digits in length and SHOULD NOT be easily guessable, individually identifiable (e.g., part of a Social Security Number or phone number), or commonly used (e.g., 000000, 123456).
PIV Cards MAY support card activation by the card management system to support card personalization and post-issuance card update. To activate the card for personalization or update, the card management system SHALL perform a challenge response protocol using cryptographic keys stored on the card in accordance with [SP 800-73]. When cards are personalized, each PIV Card SHALL contain a unique PIV Card application administration key specific to that PIV Card. PIV Card application administration keys SHALL meet the algorithm and key size requirements stated in [SP 800-78].
This section provides minimum requirements for contact and contactless card readers. This section also provides requirements for PIN input devices. Further card reader requirements are specified in [SP 800-96].
Contact card readers SHALL conform to [ISO 7816] for the card-to-reader interface. These readers SHALL conform to the Personal Computer/Smart Card (PC/SC) Specification [PCSC] for the reader-to-host system interface in general-purpose desktop computing systems and SHALL conform to the requirements specified in [SP 800-96]. In systems where the readers are not connected to general-purpose desktop computing systems, the reader-to-host system interface is not specified in this Standard.
Contactless card readers SHALL conform to [ISO 14443] for the card-to-reader interface, and data transmitted over the [ISO 14443] link SHALL conform to [ISO 7816]. In cases where these readers are connected to general-purpose desktop computing systems, they SHALL conform to [PCSC] for the reader-to-host system interface and SHALL conform to the requirements specified in [SP 800-96]. In systems where the readers are not connected to general-purpose desktop computing systems, the reader-to-host system interface is not specified in this Standard.
Note: This section was formerly entitled “Reader Resilience and Flexibility.”
The content of this section has been removed since the PIV middleware specified in [SP 800-73] adequately covers reader interoperability, resilience, and flexibility for different PIV systems.
When the PIV Card is used with a PIN or OCC data for physical access, the input device SHALL be integral to (i.e., built into) the PIV Card reader. When the PIV Card is used with a PIN or OCC data for logical access (e.g., to authenticate to a website or other server), the input device is not required to be integrated with the PIV Card reader. If the input device is not integrated with the PIV Card reader, the PIN or OCC data SHALL be transmitted securely and directly to the PIV Card for card activation.
The specifications for fingerprint biometric capture devices for OCC are given in [SP 800-76].
Malicious code could be introduced into PIN capture and biometric capture devices for the purpose of compromising or otherwise exploiting the PIV Card. General good practice to mitigate malicious code threats is outside of the scope of this document (see [SP 800-53] for a catalog of security and privacy controls for federal information systems).
For some individuals, the contact surface for the ICC may be sufficient for determining the orientation of the card. ↩
Alternatively, an authorized pseudonym as provided under the law as discussed in Section 2.8.1. ↩
The CHUID as an authentication mechanism in Section 6.2.5 has been removed from this version of the Standard. The CHUID data element itself, however, has not been removed and continues to be mandatory as it supports other PIV authentication mechanisms. ↩
The symmetric card authentication key has been deprecated in this version of the Standard. Both the symmetric card authentication key and associated SYM-CAK authentication mechanism may be removed in a future revision of the Standard. ↩
Retired key management keys are keys that have expired, have been revoked, or have otherwise been superseded. ↩
[NISTIR 7863] addresses the appropriate use of PIN caching related to digital signatures. ↩
Private key operation with the PIV secure messaging key is defined as the use of the key to establish session keys for secure messaging or the use of key for SM-AUTH card authentication. ↩
The on-card and off-card fingerprint biometric data records are stored separately and, as conformant instances of different formal fingerprint template standards, are syntactically different. This is described more fully in [SP 800-76]. ↩
The biometric record’s CMS external digital signature certificates
field is omitted. ↩
Activation in this context refers to the unlocking of the PIV Card application so that privileged operations can be performed. ↩
A read of a CHUID or use of the card authentication key is not considered a privileged operation. ↩