

Comment Template for: NIST SP 800-63-4 Suite (Initial Public Draft)

Please submit responses to dig-comments@nist.gov by March 24, 2023

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Comment #	Publication (Base, 63A, 63B, 63C)	Section	Page #	Line #	Comment (Include rationale for comment)	Suggested Change
1	63B	5.1.1.2 and 5.2.3	14		These sections are overloaded with important, distinct provisions. See letter submitted separately.	Add another level of outlining. See letter submitted separately.
2	63B	5.2.2	31		Rate limiting measures can discourage use of complex passwords for fear of being locked out	Add provisions that make entering passwords less scary without reducing security. See next items
3	63B	5.2.2	31		Hitting return before entering a password is a common user error. There is no benefit to an attacker who does so.	In counting failed attempts verifiers MAY ignore attempts with a blank password field.
4	63B	5.2.2	31		Users often enter a password that is the same as the previous attempt's password, typically because they have the wrong	In counting failed attempts verifiers MAY ignore attempts where the password entered is the same as the previous attempt
5	63B	5.2.2	31		Having Caps Lock on is another common user error. An attacker knows the passwords they are trying.	Password verifiers MAY report to users that their Caps Lock key is on
6	63B	5.2.2	31		Long passwords should be encouraged, but they increase the risk of typing mistakes. Users of long passwords should be g	Password verifiers MAY allow additional failed attempts when long passwords are entered. [e.g. Allow one additional fail
7	63B	5.2.2	31		Password throttling can be used to deny service, say by a competitor bricking a presenter's unguarded laptop at a confere	Password verifiers MAY allow one failed-attempt-count reset using a second authentication method.
8	63B	5.1.1.2	16	751	Users should have a way to know the key derivation function and iteration count used to protect their passwords so they c	Password verifiers SHOULD disclose to users the key derivation function and iteration count currently used to protect store
9	63B	5.1.1.2	16	751	The pattern "stored_hash = SHAx(password, salt)" is too easily reversed in practice.	The new guidelines should explicitly state that protecting stored passwords using a single pass of a standard fast hash fun
10	63B	5.1.1.2	16	751	Password storage security needs to be upgraded from time to time as computing power available for password cracking	Verifier user records SHOULD include a version number to allow easy upgrades to stronger hash algorithms.